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THE CASE FOR A RHODESIAN GOLD SUBSIDY1
R. S. WALKER
I wish to divide my paper into three sections. First, it is necessary to deal 
with the position which gold occupies in the world. Secondly, I propose to 
relate this world position to Rhodesia and leading on from these two 
considerations I then wish to explain how I think a gold subsidy could be 
operated in this country. I propose to consider gold as money. It is true that 
the industrial use of gold is on the increase throughout the world and the 
special properties of this metal will no doubt result in an ever increasing 
industrial application because of its very special qualities. As modem 
industrial requirements become increasingly precise and sophisticated the 
indestructibility, malleability and high conductivity of gold will become 
industrially ever more important even at the high price which must be paid 
for it. John Lock defined money as “Some useless thing that men desire but 
which is useless in relation to living needs.” In other words Lock considered 
that money must be precious and ever since the beginning of time men have 
regarded gold as precious and desirable for itself. This in an emotional 
conviction rather than a rational idea but it is all the more real because it is 
based on emotion. In the most troubled and politically disturbed parts of the 
world today when ordinary people have lost confidence in almost every other 
means of exchange, gold retains its value and in many cases increases its 
value greatly. During the last war, agents parachuted into the Balkans and 
the Middle East were invariably supplied with gold and this was accepted 
for its value by friend and enemy alike.
A more modem definition of money than that which I have quoted from 
John Lock, is the definition of currency and promissory documents which 
are immediately negotiable. I  want to suggest to you that money can be 
divided into two broad sections. Firstly, there is money which has value in 
itself. For example, the only money which we have in Rhodesia with anything 
like a real worth approaching its value is the penny which is equivalent to 
copper valued at approximately £650 per long ton. During the last few years 
copper has, on occasion, reached this price. There is, however, little money 
in circulation throughout the world today which has a value in itself. This 
form of money can be termed old fashioned money or, as I would put it 
“value money.” The other type of money which is much more modem has 
been called by Dr. J. E. Holloway, the noted South African economist,
1. Paper read to the Society in July, 1967.
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“authoritarian money.” Authoritarian money depends for its value on the 
authority standing behind it. For example, the value of a Rhodesian pound 
note depends on the Government and banking machinery which operates in 
order to ensure that 20/- worth of goods or services may be obtained for 
a one pound note. At this point it is necessary to differentiate between credit 
and authoritarian money. Personally I incline to the view that all our money 
today is merely credit and that a one pound note which is a promise to pay 
on demand is just as much credit as an agreement to provide finance in six 
months’ time. However, modern convention inclines to the view that only 
credit documents or balances which can be negotiated immediately should 
be classified as money.
Responsibility of Governments
It must be recognised that since governments have taken on responsibility 
for the economic health of the countries which they govern they have been 
forced to use credit control mechanisms in order to carry out this 
responsibility. For example, a government operating through its central bank 
and through its commercial banking system has only two main considerations 
when deciding how much or how little credit it will allow to become available 
in the country which it governs: and, as I have already said, our currency 
in circulation is merely an extension of the credit availability which the 
government is prepared to allow. Even when the private financial sector of 
a country has insufficient confidence to make available credit in the normal 
way it is still open for a government through heavy government spending and 
various other methods to pump purchasing power into a community.
The two considerations which I have just mentioned are, firstly, the danger 
of inflation within a country through the creation of excess credit. This is to 
say that if there is too much credit created and therefore too much purchasing 
power in relation to goods and services available, the value of the monetary 
term in which the credit is expressed is bound to fall and one pound’s worth 
of credit or purchasing power buys an ever decreasing amount of goods and 
services because the goods and services which the public wishes to acquire 
are just not available. There are fairly accurate methods of measuring 
inflation in a modern economy and so this aspect can be watched by the 
powers that be. The second consideration is the question of the country’s 
financial relationship with the outside world and whether it has sufficient 
exports to pay for the imports which it wishes to buy. This consideration can 
be controlled by the instruments of currency control, import control and, 
to a certain extent, export control: despite the sacrifice which has to be 
made to these controls in the flow of development capital and loan capital 
of various kinds between countries. This has particular reference with regard
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to the economic assistance which the less developed countries of the world 
nowadays expect to attract from the more highly developed financial systems 
of the richer and more complicated countries. It is to this second consideration 
which I wish to relate the role of gold.
I have already explained that in the world today, most money is 
authoritarian money which depends on a political organisation such as a 
government for its value. International money, that is the money which is 
used for the settlement of debts between countries cannot be considered as 
authoritarian money unless there is an international political system to ensure 
its value. The United Nations seems to lack the power or ability to fulfil this 
role and therefore international money has to be considered as a money 
of mutual confidence between countries or to go back to the old fashioned 
kind of money as value money. I should therefore like to divide international 
money into confidence money and value money.
International Liquidity
During the last five or six years, the world has become increasingly 
concerned with an alleged lack of international liquidity. In other words, 
with the ever increasing volume of international trade and the ever decreasing 
lack of confidence between countries, the money available for settling inter­
national debts had fallen substantially below that required to carry on world 
trade. The most financially powerful nations of the world belong to an 
organisation known as the Group of Ten, and these countries have been 
discussing this question of international liquidity with greater and greater 
concern during the last years and even months.
After the last war, an international agreement was reached at Bretton 
Woods which stipulated that the American dollar and British sterling should 
become the main currencies for international trade. It was- accepted that these 
two currencies and, in fact, all other currencies belonging to countries who 
eventually joined the International Monetary Fund should be pegged to gold 
at a value of $35 per fine ounce. I  should like to quote two of the provisions 
included in the agreement setting up the International Monetary Fund. 
Firtsly, the par values of the currencies of members must be defined in gold 
or in the U.S. dollar of the weight and fineness of 1944, which is to say in gold. 
The other provision I would like to quote is that the fund may make uniform 
proportionate changes in par values that is, a rise in the price of gold for all 
currencies by a vote including its largest members but no country need 
accept a change in the price of gold in its own currency. Since Bretton Woods 
there has been a sharp decline in the willingness of the world as a whole to 
use sterling as a currency of international settlement owing to lack of 
confidence in the basis of sterling which is the British economy. Until the
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last few years, the American dollar did not suffer from this lack of confidence. 
However, a continuing balance of payments deficit in the United States 
economy has now resulted in a fall of confidence in the dollar. I do not think 
this fall of confidence is material as the great strength of the American 
economy allows the United States to claim with considerable justification 
that she is the banker of the world. However, the last few years has seen the 
French reluctance to hold dollar balances and this same reluctance has been 
demonstrated to a lesser extent in other quarters. This has, of course, been 
amplified by the ever increasing dollar balances which many countries hold as 
part of their national reserves. As a result there have been a casting around 
for some alternative. The most obvious alternative is international money 
of last resort which must be “value money” rather than confidence money and 
the only “value money” available internationally is gold or direct trade barter. 
This latter system is extremely complicated and unwieldy in operation and 
for the purpose of my argument is of no significance. Gold therefore 
has been increasingly considered as the most reliable method of settling 
international debts. There is, however, insufficient gold to fill the gap.
The UJ§. as World Banker?
Much international thought has been given towards the creation of 
so-called paper gold or else a new form of international credit unit to replace 
the dollar and sterling. A substantial volume of economic thought in America 
and elsewhere considers that as America can rightly be considered as the 
banker of the world, she should then be entitled to use normal banking practice 
and apply the old principle of banking within a settled country that all 
demand deposits will never be drawn out at one time and therefore it is 
unnecessary to maintain reserves to meet a total run on the bank. It seems 
unthinkable that all the countries holding dollar balances at present should 
together wish to see these dollar balances immediately translated into goods 
and services from the United States. There is considerable strength in this 
argument but the whole difficulty as I see it, is the question of proportion 
and the question of guessing how great the volume of countries who wish to 
liquidate their dollar balances is likely to be at any given time. Nobody can 
tell this as it depends on international politics, on war and peace, and on the 
general world balance of power.
In my opinion this view of America as the world’s banker goes com­
pletely contrary to the basic requirement of confidence money or authoritarian 
money in that it must have a completely reliable political machine behind it 
with the power to enforce its value. Even the United States does not have 
that power in the world today. If this analysis is extended to the proposed 
role to be played by paper gold or other forms of international reserve units
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the weakness is even more apparent. There have been several other devices 
used with considerable success during recent years, such as swop credits and 
Euro-dollars which are both agreements between countries to settle their 
outstandings more easily by mutual book entries.
All these devices only postpone the day when the increasing demand for 
international value money is bound to cause an economic crisis of great 
proportions. In simpler terms an international lack of mutual confidence 
which is the stuff out of which all depressions are made. In the modern world 
we should be very grateful that economic measurement techniques are 
sufficiently reliable to predict impending financial crises and to give some hope 
of remedial action being taken in advance. The remedial action which is 
gathering more support every day is an increase in the price of gold throughout 
the entire world as was envisaged in one of the provisions devised at Bretton 
Woods which I  mentioned earlier in this paper.
A Rise in the World Gold Price?
Gold has been valued since 1934 at 35 U.S. dollars per ounce. It has been 
maintained at this value by a very simple device in that the United States 
has been prepared to buy or sell gold within a few points of this price. It is 
unnecessary to explain that any commodity can be kept at a completely stable 
price provided one organisation has sufficiently selling and buying capacity to 
be prepared to buy and sell at a fixed price. The American economy is 
sufficiently large to do this.
I would like to examine in greater detail the predicament for America 
which gold shortage provides. During recent years private and national 
hoarding of gold has become almost a dominant feature in the world’s finances. 
To illustrate this I should like to quote the following figures:
Calendar Free World Russian Supply of Total to Addition to
Year Production Sales Gold Private
Use
Monetary
Stocks
1962 37.7 6.0 43.7 —34.7 9.0
1963 39.2* 16.0 55.2 —31.2 24.0
1964 40.6* 13.0 53.6 —32.6 21.0
1965 41.7* 16.0 57.7 —45.7 12.0
1966 41.7* — 41.7* —41.7* Nil
* Estimated or Provisional figure
Thus, during 1966, it has been estimated that the total production of 
new gold went to hoarding. There was thus no new gold available for 
the normal purpose of international money. If you add to this the fact
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that all holders of dollar balances consider themselves as entitled to 
payment in gold as a payment of last resort, the situation for America 
becomes really serious. As I have mentioned earlier, the French have been 
converting dollars into gold for some time and the Chinese convert all their 
American dollar balances into gold as quickly as possible.
Now consider America’s position. At present her short term liabilities 
amount to approximately 26 billion dollars plus 5 billion dollars which she 
owes to international organisations thus making 31 billion dollars in all. At 
present America holds approximately 13 billion dollars in gold and, in 
addition, has a deficit in her balance of payments position which at present 
there appears to be little hope of correcting. If we are to accept that America 
is the world’s banker, this is quite a comfortable position banking wise 
provided that there is no run on the bank; that is, given world stability. 
France, for example, has only drawn between 1 and 2 billion dollars during 
her recent gold buying campaign. However, America’s gold reserves continue 
to fall in actual fact and more so in ratio to her commitments. Washington 
is thought to regard the safety limit for American gold as 10 billion dollars. 
At this point I would like to remark on recent announcements made by the 
two largest banks in America.
“The Chase Manahattan Bank mentioned the well-known fact that, as 
the total liquid liabilities of U.S. banks to foreigners is over two times the 
amount of the U.S. gold stock, a run on that stock could not possibly be 
satisfied. To that they added the following: ‘If it is made unmistakably 
clear that in the event of a crisis the U.S. would simply terminate the 
privilege now given to foreign central banks of buying gold freely, then the 
burden of decision regarding the defence of the dollar would be shifted 
even more than now from the U.S. to the shoulders of European and other 
Central Banks’. The words and the meaning are clear, but it is difficult 
to believe that an American bank could have seen fit to publish them.
Shortly afterwards the President of the Bank of America, the largest 
bank in the U.S.A., said the following: ‘In the event a cumulative gold 
drain becomes intolerable, we will have no choice but to react with more 
massive retaliatory measures. These measures, which will inevitably include 
the abandonment of our gold selling policy, it must be made clear, are the 
efforts of last resort, to be taken only when it is abundantly evident that 
other major countries are not prepared to function under the only feasible 
international monetary system—that is to say the dollar standard’.”
Now what can America do? If she increases the price of gold she virtually 
defaults in the eyes of her creditors because they agreed to hold American 
dollars believing these to be worth 35 dollars to one ounce. If America does 
not increase the price of gold she continues to weaken the dollar at least in
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the eyes of much of the world. If she agrees to stop selling gold at $35 an 
ounce the price of gold will increase rapidly throughout the rest of the world 
through shortage of supply. This could be a way of rectifying America’s 
difficulties without having to take the positive step of re-valuing gold herself 
but it would smack of somewhat sharp practice. Thus the only thing left 
for America to do, as most of her economic thinking sees it at present, is to 
attempt to persuade the rest of the world to accept more and more paper 
credit in place of gold. As I have already said, international credit requires 
international authority to become money and where is the international 
authority to give this credit value and thus turn it into real money?
In my view and within a few years America will be forced to pressurise 
the rest of the world into following one of the solutions set out at Bretton 
Woods, that is, a general increase in the value of gold carried out by all the 
major currencies of the world at the same time. Such an increase would have 
little significance unless the price of gold was doubled to $70 dollars per ounce.; 
This measure of re-valuing gold while essential in the near future is not one 
which should be repeated any more frequently than can be avoided. Thus 
there is every argument for a substantial increase when an increase in price 
has to be made.
The argument that the only countries which would really benefit from 
an increase in the price of gold are South Africa and Russia is fallacious. 
It would be 14 years before South Africa achieved the advantage of re-valuing 
gold which America would get through the stock of gold which she at present 
holds. In fact, as far as South Africa is concerned an increase in the price of 
gold at present would only add to the inflationary pressures which the South 
African government is using every endeavour to suppress. Russia might be 
helped in the short run in that she would receive a greater volume of western 
goods for her gold output, but this in turn would surely ally the Russian 
system closer and closer to the western system: a highly desirable political 
objective in the world of today.
The Group of Ten are at present considering all kinds of new credit and 
international currency unit systems. I  can see no satisfactory answer except 
an increase in the price of gold and from reading the speeches and thinking 
of world economists there is an ever increasing proportion who are coming 
round to this view.
The Position in Rodesia
Now I  want to consider the position in Rhodesia. During 1965, Rhodesia 
produced between 500,000 and 600.000 ounces of gold. She is a very small 
country by world standards as a gold producer. Rhodesia has no necessity 
for gold to back her currency as exchange control and import control enable
the Rhodesian government to dictate the value of the Rhodesian pound in 
terms of the hard currencies of the world. Rhodesia uses Rhodesian currency 
inside Rhodesia and other people’s currency outside Rhodesia. Thus within 
the country she uses a complete authoritarian system of money while outside 
she uses money attached to the authoritarianism of other countries .Thus 
I want to stress again that internally Rhodesia has no necessity for gold to 
back her currency and while other countries are prepared to allow Rhodesia 
to deal in their currencies she does not require gold for her external trans­
actions, but suppose things became more difficult.
Gold has two tremendous advantages, firstly, it is value money which 
anybody will accept anywhere. Secondly, it can be transferred into goods and 
services at a very low selling cost. It has, of course, the disadvantage that 
unlike balances held in foreign currencies it earns no interest.
When a man loses confidence in his bank he hides his savings under the 
bed in an old sock. This is also how one must perhaps retain some reserves 
during an economic war.
Normally it is sound economics to avoid subsidising production of any 
given commodity as this must in the end encourage inefficiency and inflation. 
However, under Rhodesia’s present circumstances with a closed economy and 
lack of full employment the country can create credit a t will right up to 
the point of inflation. This is a system we can use to finance tobacco stock­
piling. Now just suppose our stockpiled tobacco was gold, what a wonderful 
reserve of puchasing power internationally speaking this would be and if we 
can stockpile tobacco on the basis of what may be subsidised prices, then 
how much more to our advantage it would be to stockpile gold. Surely if 
we have to accept the restrictions and lack of economic freedom which our 
present circumstances demand and the continuation of a managed economy 
we should also be able to obtain some of the advantages and stockpile sub­
sidised gold.
The question arises of how this is to be done. One of the provisos of the 
Bretton Woods agreement, was that no member of the International Monetary 
Fund may buy or sell gold at a price above or below par value plus or minus 
the margin prescribed by the Fund. This is at present 1%. Although it is 
questionable whether Rhodesia still remains a member of the International 
Monetary Fund, there is a strong argument in favour of maintaining our 
financial integrity completely unimpaired so that the rest of the world may 
say we don’t like your politics but we trust your economics.
Several countries have found ways round this difficulty. There are gold 
subsidy arrangements in Canada and Australia together with several other 
countries. We in this country have the gold assistance legislation which allows 
a mine to be assisted up to the maximum extent of £3 per ounce in certain 
circumstances and provided that no profit is made.
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We are a small enough producer of gold in this country for each individual 
mining enterprise to be considered on its individual merits and to be provided 
with the necessary incentive to produce more gold. This incentive must 
include an element of profit because in our type of economy the profit motive 
is of the essence and men will only give of their best when the carrot of profit 
enters into their thinking at least to a limited extent. This is nothing to be 
ashamed of.
In our present circumstances it is not necessary to balance our national 
budget on both revenue and capital account although I think it advisable 
to balance the budget on revenue account. Savings can always be used either 
for development or for stockpiling in any circumstances. In fact one must 
maintain a judicious mixture of both. It is unfortunate that in the system of 
government accounting which we have inherited from Great Britain we only 
consider the payments and the receipts and never the value of the accumula­
tions. The picture of the housewife who always spends her money in buying 
new mechanical aids while maintaining an empty store cupboard is all too 
familiar in this country.
There is one aspect of gold mining on which I  wish to touch briefly. 
It is wrong to believe that gold which is not mined today can be mined 
tomorrow. The cost of extracting gold ore from the ground depends on the 
means of access available. When shaft systems are abandoned, allowed to 
fill with water and decay, the cost of going back again to recover ore which 
was previously unpayable has become prohibitive even with a rise in the 
value of gold. If we do not provide means by which our gold mining industry 
can extract the gold available to it today, this gold will not be available to 
us tomorrow.
Conclusions
I have tried to show that I believe there will be an increase in 
the price of gold within the next few years. Secondly, I have tried to explain 
how important a greater production of gold and a stockpile of gold can be 
for Rhodesia during an economic war even if there is no increase in the 
price of gold. We are a small country, smaller financially than some of the 
great businesses of the world. If we regard ourselves as a large business 
enterprise rather than a country there is, for the reasons I have already given, 
an overwhelming justification for increasing our output of gold now through 
artificial financial means. If this is true when Rhodesia is considered as a 
business, then it is certainly true when Rhodesia is considered as a country.
The necessary legislation is available to us and requires only modest 
amendment. Our managed economy makes the provision of credit possible
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without damaging the economy of the country. At worst we shall reap the 
benefit of greater reserves with which to fight an economic war. At best we 
shall secure the major advantage of an increase in the price of gold and the 
ability to buy twice as many goods and services from abroad for one ounce 
of gold as we can secure at present.
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